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FISHING VESSELS

Summaries of Reports of Investigations
into Marine Casualties and Accidents
Aboard Ships

Issue No. 5 August 1988

Summaries of Fishing Vessel Marine Casualties and Accidents

This publication summarizes the Reports of Investigation into marine casualties and/or marine accidents involving fishing vessels which were investigated by the Marine Casualty Investigations Division of Transport Canada and is published three times a year. There is another publication covering commercial vessels and other craft.

Note:

1. A glossary of terms and abbreviations used can be found at the end of this publication.

2. Unless stated otherwise, all times mentioned in this publication are local times.

3. Unless stated otherwise, all Regulations referred to in this publication are made pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act.

The full report of the summaries contained herein may be obtained by writing to:

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Their contents may be deficient and misleading if used in any other process and are not to be used or admitted in evidence in any legal proceedings, either civil or criminal, arising out of any casualty described therein. The statements, opinions and findings in the reports and summaries are those of the Marine Casualty Investigations Division only and do not constitute admissions made by or on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada.

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"L'ÉMÉRILLON II" / "PIERRE PAUL"

Collision in Caraquet Channel, N.B., August 17, 1987

Summary

FV "L'ÉMÉRILLON II"

The 54.02 gross ton, Caraquet-registered small wooden fishing vessel "L'ÉMÉRILLON II" is 18.44 m long and was in possession of a valid Steamship Inspection Certificate SIC 29. Her navigation equipment included an appropriately licensed VHF R/T station, an echo sounder, a Loran C, a radar and an autopilot. She was manned by a crew of 3 comprising 2 deck-hands and an experienced skipper who, although not required by regulations, held a Fishing Master's Certificate but did not hold a mandatorily required Restricted Radio-telephone Operator's Certificate (Maritime).

The fishing vessels "GILLES L" and "L'ÉMÉRILLON II" departed the Bas-Caraquet wharf at about 0900, August 17, in fog and near-zero visibility, bound for the shrimp fishing grounds off Anticosti Island. Both vessels progressed slowly; the "L'ÉMÉRILLON II" was following the "GILLES L" which was barely visible some 30 m to 40 m on the port quarter and maintaining communication on VHF R/T channel 70. The watch aboard the "L'ÉMÉRILLON II" was manned by the skipper stationed in the wheel-house and two deck-hands on the forecastle maintaining a look-out. The "GILLES L" was barely visible and from time to time her fog signal could be heard by the "L'ÉMÉRILLON II".

Both vessels touched bottom some 200 m SW of buoy 'EM8'. After identifying the buoy, the vessel's course was adjusted to 070° (M) and her speed 3 knots. They then detected the presence of another vessel on the radar, later identified to be the "PIERRE PAUL", proceeding in an opposite direction in the channel. At about 1000, the "L'ÉMÉRILLON II" and the "PIERRE PAUL" were involved in a collision with the "L'ÉMÉRILLON II" sustaining only superficial damage.

FV "PIERRE PAUL"

The 18.5 gross ton, Caraquet-registered small wooden fishing vessel "PIERRE PAUL" was 13 m long and was not in possession of a valid Steamship Inspection Certificate SIC 29 as required by the regulations. Her navigation equipment included an appropriately licensed VHF radio station, an echo sounder, a Loran C and a radar. The four-member crew comprised 3 deck-hands and an experienced skipper who held no marine certificate nor was he required to by the Canada Shipping Act but, although required by regulations, no crew

member held a Restricted Radiotelephone Operator's Certificate (Maritime).

The "PIERRE PAUL", with a catch of some 6 t of herring onboard was inbound in the Caraquet Channel at 0930, August 17, with the skipper at the helm, a deck-hand maintaining a look-out stationed on the starboard wing and the remaining crew asleep in the forward accommodation. Upon entering the channel, the already reduced visibility worsened. The vessel was heading 240° (M) at a speed of 8 knots. The skipper, upon detecting the presence of other vessels on the radar, switched the range to 0.5 miles but as there were several echoes on the PPI, he did not pay attention to any in particular. He maintained his course and speed, believing that he will be able to pass clear of the vessels approaching from the opposite direction, as is normally done in good visibility. Shortly after passing buoy 'EM7' he heard a fog signal of a vessel, later identified as the "GILLES L", as having come from ahead. He barely missed colliding with her and before he could react, he sighted the "L'ÉMÉRILLON II", coming out of the fog, right ahead. The collision was unavoidable and both vessels collided. The "PIERRE PAUL" sustained extensive damage to her bow section.

Events following the Collision

As the damage to "PIERRE PAUL" was extensive, her crew was taken aboard the "L'ÉMÉRILLON II" and the former taken in tow abreast. Both vessels arrived in Bas-Caraquet at 1130, where, "PIERRE PAUL" was later dry docked and following inspection declared to be a constructive total loss. Her estimated value was $40,000.

Findings

The collision in the narrow channel in reduced visibility and during daylight between the fishing vessels "L'ÉMÉRILLON II" and "PIERRE PAUL" occurred because neither vessel conformed with the provisions of the Collision Regulations. It would appear that the following factors contributed to the casualty:

a) **"PIERRE PAUL"**

- did not maintain a proper lookout as required by Rule 5 of the Collision Regulations;

- did not proceed at a safe speed as required by Rules 6 and 19(b) of the Collision Regulations;

- did not use the information obtained from the radar set in an appropriate manner as required by Rule 7(b)(c) of the Collision Regulations;

- did not navigate as close as possible to the outer limit of the channel that lay on her starboard side as required by Rule 9(a) of the Collision Regulations;

- did not reduce her speed to a minimum required to maintain steerage way as required by Rule (19(e) of the Collision Regulations;

- did not sound fog signals as required by Rule 35(a) of the Collision Regulations;

b) **"L'ÉMÉRILLON II"**

- detected on the radar the presence of other vessels proceeding in the opposite direction but did not determine if risk of collision existed as required by Rule 7(b)(c) of the Collision Regulations;

- did not take appropriate measures to avoid collision as required by Rule 19(d) of the Collision Regulations;

- did not navigate as close as possible to the outer limit of the channel that lay on her starboard side as required by Rule 9(a) of the Collision Regulations;

- did not sound the fog signals as required by Rule 35(a) of the Collision Regulations.

Other Findings

The "PIERRE PAUL" had not been in possession of a valid Steamship Inspection Certificate since 1975 as required by the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations.

The skippers of both vessels were not in possession of a Restricted Radiotelephone Operator's Certificate as required by the General Radio Regulations made pursuant to the Radio Act.



"L'EMERILLON II"/"PIERRE PAUL"

SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4439	SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4439 DU SHC

"L'EMERILLON II" moored to the Bas-Caraquet wharf the day after the collision.

"L'EMERILLON II" accosté au quai de Bas-Caraquet le lendemain de l'abordage.

Impact marks on stem and forward starboard planking.

Traces de l'impact sur l'étrave et sur le bordé tribord avant.

"PIERRE PAUL"



Damaged starboard planking in way of the fish hold forward watertight bulkhead.

Bordé tribord avarié au droit de la cloison étanche avant de la cale à poisson.



Damaged port planking in way of the fish hold watertight bulkhead.

Bordé bâbord avarié au droit de la cloison étanche de la cale à poisson.

"COAST HARVESTER"

Capsizing and sinking with loss of one life off Flores Island, B.C., August 31, 1987.

Summary

The "COAST HARVESTER", employed in geoduck and sea urchin fishing, was a 14 gross ton, vessel of fibreglass construction, built in 1979 at Delta, B.C. This Vancouver-registered vessel was shallow drafted with a single chine hull form and a transom stern. She had a deck-house located forward, a small hold amidships and the engine compartment with recently constructed processing house aft of amidships. The vessel was equipped with a VHF R/T and neither the equipment nor the operator were licensed.

In preparation for the geoduck fishery opening on September 1, 1987, the "COAST HARVESTER" loaded some 340 fish cages, of which 150 were stowed on the main deck, 60 on the forward house-top and 130 on top of the processing house. She departed Port Hardy with a crew of 2 and, following a brief stop in Hot Springs Cove, headed for Tofino. It was noticed on leaving Hot Springs Cove that the vessel was low in the water aft and that an accumulated amount of water was being retained on the afterdeck. It was also known that the amidships hold manhole cover had a leaking seal allowing water to gain access to the hold but as the cages were stowed on top of it and there was no suction in that compartment, it was decided to bale it out later in Tofino.

In NW winds at 20-25 knots, slight sea and slight/moderate NW'ly swell, the "COAST HARVESTER" followed the outside route to Tofino and at about 2250, when in approximate position 49°15'N, 126°13'W, the helm was placed 'hard-a-port' to alter course for Russell Channel, at which time the vessel developed a starboard list of 30°-40° and shipped seas over the stern, flooding the engine compartment. The operator placed the engine in neutral and awakened his brother. Appraisal of the situation onboard revealed that the engine-room was flooded, the battery was underwater and the automatic bilge pump in that compartment was not functioning. With the main engine ignition switch turned off, the engine continued to run and before any remedial action could be taken, two large waves broke over the stern of the vessel leaving the starboard side submerged. The operator then transmitted a 'MAYDAY' on VHF R/T channel 16 which was intercepted by the CGRS Tofino, thus setting in motion SAR operations. Shortly thereafter the vessel sank. The operator who managed to escape through the port sliding window was rescued some 12 hours later, suffering from hypothermia, while the deck-hand who remained trapped inside

the cabin was not found.

Additionally it should be noted that the vessel's modification subsequent to construction resulted in additional top-side weights, the three relatively small open unflapped freeing ports on each side permitted water shipped on deck to accumulate, and an unbaffled ventilation opening located on the transom at gunwale level allowed water to enter the engine-room. All of the aforementioned resulted in additional weights that further reduced the vessel's inherent low freeboard. This, in conjunction with the free-surface effects of the liquids adversely effected the vessel's transverse stability eventually leading to her capsize.

The casualty resulted in the death of a deck-hand and the loss of the "COAST HARVESTER" with an estimated value of $60,000.

Findings

The "COAST HARVESTER" capsized and sank on August 31, 1987, in slight/moderate weather conditions off Flores Island on the West Coast of Vancouver Island as a result of having insufficient transverse stability to withstand the dynamic heeling forces imposed upon her. It would appear that the following factors contributed to the reduction of transverse stability and the loss of the vessel:

- the vessel's centre of gravity was raised and the low inherent freeboard further reduced by the cumulative effects of the weight and vertical location of structural additions and fishing gear, installed and loaded above the well deck and on the deck-house tops;

- the installation of the open well deck freeing ports reduced the designed effective freeboard permitting water to come on deck at the small angle of heel of 5.5°; the freeing ports were not large enough for rapid shedding of water nor were they fitted with hinged flaps to restrict water coming onto the deck;

- the weight and free-surface effect of water shipped and retained on deck increased the after trim, reduced the freeboard and drastically lowered the transverse stability;

- the defective seal on the manhole cover permitted water to downflood into the hold, the weight and free-surface effect of the water reducing the freeboard and transverse stability;

- the weight and free-surface effect of water shipped in the engine compartment by way of an unbaffled transom ventilator increased the after trim, reduced the freeboard and further lowered the transverse stability;

- the dynamic heeling effect of the slack water while the vessel was turning to port overcame the reduced initial transverse stability, immersed the starboard gunwale, accelerated the rate at which water was being shipped, and prevented the vessel's recovery; and

- the downflooding progressed until all positive transverse stability was lost, the vessel capsized and eventually sank.

Other Findings

The automatic bilge pump in the engine compartment malfunctioned.

It was imprudent to put the vessel to sea with a leaking seal to the amidships hold manhole cover particularly with sea water in the hold.

There was no means to drain/pump the underdeck void and hold spaces.

The vessel's VHF R/T equipment was not licenced in accordance with the Radio Act.

The operator of the vessel did not hold a Restricted Radiotelephone Operator's Certificate (Maritime) as required by the General Radio Regulations made pursuant to the Radio Act.

The inherent low freeboard of the vessel, designed primarily for diving operations, is dangerous for adverse open water conditions.

It would appear that Eric Demers became trapped in the cabin area due to the speed with which the vessel capsized and he went under with the vessel.



SECTION OF CHS CHART No. L/C 3603

SECTION DE LA CARTE N° L/C 3603 DU SHC

"COAST HARVESTER"

Note: freeing ports.

Nota : sabords de décharge.

"JEFFREY 'N' NEIL"

Ingress of water and subsequent sinking on Banquereau Bank, Atlantic Ocean, September 14, 1987.

Summary

The 39.77 gross ton wooden longliner "JEFFREY 'N' NEIL" was built in 1967 at Parker's Cove, N.S. She was 15.61 m in length with a cabin forward of the wheel-house and engine-room, fish hold and lazaret aft. The fish hold was sub-divided fore and aft and athwartships into 18 pens. The four through-hull fittings comprising bronze valves with galvanized steel nipples were prone to corrosion due to electrolytic action.

Between December 3, 1984 and June 9, 1986 four separate steamship inspections were carried out when a number of deficiencies including worm action and dry rot were found in sections of the vessel's hull. These were incorporated on the SI7 certificates which were issued to the owner. The last such certificate included a statement that repairs to the fish hold and other areas that may be affected on removal of rotted wood were to be carried out prior to the vessel's next inspection on December 2, 1988, i.e. the expiry date of SIC 29 certificate. At the time of the casualty, this work had not been completed.

The vessel departed Louisbourg, N.S. on September 9, 1987 and following her arrival at the Banquereau Bank fishing grounds fished for some 3 days. Her catch of some 9,000 kg of cod was stowed in six forward pens of the fish hold. At about 0600, September 14, the crew members noticed an unusual amount of water in the centre part of the fish hold. The skipper was alerted and as he went to start the engine-operated bilge pump, he noticed water in the engine-room so one of the two battery-operated pumps was also activated. The engine-room apparently quickly drained and after about 2 hours, the water level in the fish hold remained constant.

The vessel then proceeded at one-half knot towards the trawl buoy. At about 1030, the vessel was stopped and the trawl hooked on. It was now noticed that the water was further ingressing into the fish hold so a third pump was activated. Two tubs were filled with fish but as the ingress increased in rate, a fourth gasoline pump was activated and the engine put 'ahead'. It was noticed that the forward movement of the vessel tended to decrease the ingress of sea-water indicating the existence of 'venturi-effect' and an apparent loss of watertight integrity below the waterline.

At about 1230, the F.V. "ATKINSON" was advised of the

situation on board the "JEFFREY 'N' NEIL" on VHF R/T channel 6 but no call was ever made to a CGRS and no distress messages were broadcast. By 1500, it was evident that the pumps were unable to cope with the ingress and preparations were made to abandon the vessel. At 1530 the engines stalled and the vessel started to settle bodily. Shortly after 1600, the crew members abandoned the vessel wearing lifejackets and boarded the liferaft while the skipper transmitted a final message giving the vessel's position. By 1615, with the water level in the wheel-house above his knees, the skipper abandoned the vessel but left his lifejacket in the wheel-house.

In the meantime, the owner was advised of the situation on board the "JEFFREY 'N' NEIL" by another fishing vessel on MF R/T at 1610, some 10 hours after the first ingress of water was noticed and only about 30 minutes before the vessel sank. He then advised RCC of the situation. By 1726 the survivors were picked up by the "ATKINSON" and taken to Louisbourg, arriving there at about 0700 September 15.

The vessel sank at 1645 in position 44°34'48"N, 57°15'30"W. There was no evidence of pollution from the sunken vessel which had an approximate resale value of some $150,000 and a catch valued at about $18,000.

Findings

Whilst fishing off the east coast of Nova Scotia on September 14, 1987, the Canadian fishing vessel "JEFFREY 'N' NEIL" sank in relatively good weather conditions due to ingress of water below the waterline, the source of which is unknown.

The sinking of the vessel precluded any examination. Hence in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it would appear that either or a combination of the following factors may have contributed to the casualty:

- electrolytic action resulting in corrosion of the underwater through-hull fittings due to dissimilar metals being used in their construction; and/or

- although not readily visible, some underwater hull planking may have been weakened due to worm action and dry rot, resulting in its failure.

Other Findings

Neither the VHF R/T nor the MF R/T on board the "JEFFREY 'N' NEIL" was used to broadcast a general

distress call.

The owner who had access to an MF R/T and the Coast Guard Radio Stations that monitor the MF R/T distress frequency were first made aware of the casualty only minutes before the vessel sank.

No additional pumps were requested despite the awareness that the pumps on board were of insufficient capacity to contain the rate of ingress of water.

The initial indication that the "JEFFREY 'N' NEIL" was taking water and perhaps in danger of sinking was not made known to other vessels until five hours after the discovery of water ingress.


"JEFFREY 'N' NEIL"
REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. L/C 4001
SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE N° L/C 4001 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN METRES
PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES
JÉBEC
NEWFOUNDLAND
GULF OF ST LAWRENCE
GOLFE SAINT-LAURENT
LAURENTIAN CHANNEL
CHENAL LAURENTIEN
CABOT STRAIT
DÉTROIT DE CABOT
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
ÎLE DU PRINCE ÉDOUARD
CAPE BRETON ISLAND
NOVA SCOTIA / NOUVELLE-ÉCOSSE
BANQUEREAU
SABLE ISLAND BANK
SINK POSITION
LIEU DE L'ENGLOUTISSEMENT

"CAPE NORTH"

Injury sustained by a crew member whilst fishing on the Scotian Shelf, N.S., September 11, 1987.

Summary

The West German-built, 2990 gross ton factory-freezer-trawler was built in 1975 and following her purchase by the National Sea Products, the vessel was registered in Halifax in 1986. The fully self-contained vessel carries a complete line of equipment that enables her to totally process her catch on board. Included in the equipment is a mincing machine from which the product is conveyed to a mixing drum by means of a large rotating worm. The worm is operated on the principle of an Archimedes screw. The worm is surrounded by an aluminum casing which has a 90° elbow at the high end through which the product is expelled into the drum.

The "CAPE NORTH" was fishing 'THE PATCH' on Emerald Bank, some 60 miles ESE of Halifax on the morning of September 11, 1987, when, at 0300, the mincing machine operator complained of feeling ill and requested a replacement. The factory foreman initially divided this job into two parts and allocated 2 persons but, after the victim assured him that he could handle the job alone, the victim was allowed to carry out the duties of the mincing machine operator. The foreman monitored his work for a while and, when everything appeared to be operating normally, the foreman went about his other tasks.

Shortly after 0430, the mincing machine operator was trying to clean a fish build-up from a chute which projected from the elbow of the mixing drum when his hand was drawn up over the worm. As the foreman was entering a gear locker, he heard a scream. Looking back, he saw the mincing machine operator standing on the wrong side of the equipment, yelling and obviously distraught.

The foreman and several workers rushed over and one activated the 'stop' switch and stopped the machine. It was apparent that the operator had lost his left hand. He was transported to the ship's hospital for treatment.

The vessel was immediately headed for Halifax at maximum full speed and at 0457, the master advised CGRS, Halifax of the situation, at the same time, requesting a MEDEVAC by helicopter. Communications were established with the duty doctor at Victoria General Hospital, Halifax and temporary medication and treatment were prescribed and administered.

A SAR helicopter was tasked at 0549 and arrived on-scene

at 0755. The airlift was completed at 0832 with the victim arriving at the hospital at 0856.

The "CAPE NORTH" returned to the fishing grounds and during the ensuing 12 hours, modifications were made to the equipment to prevent a recurrence of the accident. All modifications were completed to the satisfaction of the Ship Safety Branch of the Canadian Coast Guard.

In July 1987, a factory worker's fingers had become jammed briefly in the screw but he was able to extricate them before suffering serious injury. Following the incident, some safety-related modifications were carried out to address the problem.

Findings

A fish-factory-worker aboard the "CAPE NORTH" had his left hand severed at the wrist whilst attempting to clear fish residue from the chute of an operating mincing machine on the morning of September 11, 1987.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to this accident:

- the imprudent action of putting his hand upwards into a space containing moving machinery thereby obliterating his view of the hand, and in so doing did not meet the requirements under sections 7(1) and 82(1) of the Safe Working Practices Regulations and the Canada Labour Code respectively;

- the equipment was not stopped prior to attempting to clear the chute of fish material;

- no guard was fitted at the elbow to prevent a hand from inadvertently coming into contact with the moving parts as required by sections 20 and 11.13(1) of the Safe Working Practices Regulations and the Canada Labour Code respectively; and

- verbal operating warnings were given, but no written warnings were posted.

Other Findings

The machine could have been switched off and the clearing operation carried out without undue difficulty.

The fact that a similar accident had occurred on board the vessel three months previously should have prompted caution and awareness when operating machinery.



"CAPE NORTH"

SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4001	SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4001 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN METRES	PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES



View inside elbow where hand was severed.

Vue de l'intérieur du coude où la main a été tranchée.



View inside elbow after modification.

Vue de l'intérieur du coude après la modification.



Re-enactment indicating where hand had to be for severance.

Reconstitution qui démontre où la main a dû être placée pour être tranchée.

Re-enactment of June incident - note guard in raised position. This would now cut all power.

Reconstitution de l'incident en juin - à noter le dispositif de sûreté en position levée. Ceci devrait maintenant couper le courant.

"BRUNSWICK MAID"/"TERRY T"

Collision off Indian Island, N.B., October 27, 1987.

Summary

F.V. "BRUNSWICK MAID"

The 41 gross ton, 2-hold "BRUNSWICK MAID" is a herring carrier with accommodation forward of the wheel-house and a lazaret aft. Built in 1920 at Deer Island, N.B., this wooden vessel was fitted with a passive radar reflector and her navigation equipment that was in operation at the time of the casualty comprised a Loran C and 2 VHF R/Ts.

After discharging a load of herring, the vessel, departed from Fairhaven, N.B. at 1445, October 27, 1987 bound for Beaver Harbour, N.B. with a crew of two. After rounding Cherry Islet, the vessel was manually steered on a course of NE (M) and was proceeding at a speed of about 9 knots. The weather conditions were fair with good visibility. When the vessel first sighted the F.V. "TERRY T" some 0.75 mile away, and about 30° on her port bow, the latter was stopped in the water. A short time later, the "TERRY T" was observed to be underway, now at an estimated distance of about 0.5 mile. The skipper of the vessel, without establishing if risk of collision existed, assumed that the "TERRY T" would pass ahead of his own vessel and so he maintained her course and speed. When it became apparent that the "TERRY T" would not clear ahead of the "BRUNSWICK MAID", the skipper now assumed that the "TERRY T" would alter course as she was a give-way vessel. However this did not occur and when the "TERRY T" came closer, the course of the "BRUNSWICK MAID" was altered 10°-15° to starboard, the engine was stopped, one long blast was sounded and the engine control put to full astern. The whistle blast was not heard aboard the "TERRY T" possibly due to her own engine noise. Both vessels collided at about 1510 in position 44°55'24"N, 66°57'24"W when the stem of the "BRUNSWICK MAID" struck the "TERRY T" just abaft amidships and forced her briefly beneath the surface.

F.V. "TERRY T"

The 6 gross ton wooden fishing vessel of open construction "TERRY T" was built in 1961 at Port Maitland, N.S. She had a partially enclosed steering position shelter forward of amidships and an open deck space aft. The vessel was operated during daylight hours only and was equipped with a magnetic compass and an echo sounder for navigation and a CB R/T for communication.

After a catch of some 45 kg of cod, the vessel departed Friars Roads for Wilsons Beach, Cambello Island, N.B. The vessel was on hand steering and following a rendezvous with another fishing vessel north-east of Cherry Islet, the vessel headed on an east-north-east course for Wilsons Beach at a speed of about 6 knots. The operator was reportedly seated at the wheel on the starboard side of the shelter preparing fishing lines and reels for a later fishing trip and occasionally glancing ahead through the forward window to keep the vessel headed towards Wilsons Beach. Although the engine of the "BRUNSWICK MAID" was very noisy, nothing was apparently heard by the operator possibly due to similar emissions from his own engine. The vessel, although being a give-way vessel, continued on her course and speed until both vessels collided. The shelter of the vessel apparently collapsed upon impact but when the "BRUNSWICK MAID" moved astern and was clear of the vessel, the operator of the "TERRY T" was seen emerging through a window frame.

Events following the collision

The deck-hand of the "BRUNSWICK MAID" ran to the bow with a line, a lifebuoy and a floater jacket intent upon effecting a rescue and when the operator of the "TERRY T" surfaced uninjured he was assisted aboard the "BRUNSWICK MAID" and taken to Wilsons Beach.

The "TERRY T" was taken in tow to Wilsons Beach by another fishing vessel where following inspection she was declared a constructive total loss. Damage to "BRUNSWICK MAID" was limited to a crack in the stem. The insured value of the "TERRY T" was $4000.

Findings

The Canadian fishing vessels "BRUNSWICK MAID" and "TERRY T" were involved in a collision off Indian Island, N.B. on October 27, 1987, in daylight and in good weather conditions resulting in the constructive total loss of the "TERRY T".

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the casualty:

the "TERRY T"

- which had the "BRUNSWICK MAID" on her starboard side did not keep out of her way nor did she avoid crossing ahead of her as required by Rule 15 of the Collision Regulations;

- did not maintain a proper look-out by sight as required by Rule 5 of the Collision Regulations; and

- not being aware of the presence of the "BRUNSWICK MAID", she did not ascertain if risk of collision existed as required by Rule 7 of the Collision Regulations;

the "BRUNSWICK MAID"

- did not use all available means to ascertain if risk of collision existed as required by Rule 7 of the Collision Regulations; and

- did not use sound signals to attract attention of the "TERRY T" as required by Rule 34 of the Collision Regulations although aware that sufficient action to avoid collision had not been taken by the "TERRY T".

Other Findings

The "TERRY T" was not equipped with Sound Signalling Apparatus as required by Rule 33 of the Collision Regulations.

The wooden fishing vessel "TERRY T" was not fitted with a Radar Reflector as required by Rule 40 of the Collision Regulations.


"BRUNSWICK MAID"/"TERRY T"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4343
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4343 DU SHC
SOUNDINGS IN FEET
PROFONDEURS EN PIEDS
POINT OF COLLISION
LIEU DE L'ABORDAGE
ESTIMATED TRACK OF "BRUNSWICK MAID"
SILLAGE ESTIMÉ DU "BRUNSWICK MAID"
ESTIMATED TRACK OF "TERRY T"
SILLAGE ESTIMÉ DU "TERRY T"
INDIAN ISLAND
WESTERN
CANADA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MOOSE I.
Indian Head
Graveyard Pt.
Thrumcap I
Deer Pt.
Dog I
Clarke Ledge
Bald Head
The Nubble
44°56'N
66°58'W
PASSAGE
ROADS
CAMPBELLTON
NEW BRUNSWICK
CHATHAM
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
MONCTON
CHARLOTTETOWN
SYDNEY
CAPE BRETON ISLAND
FREDERICTON
NOVA SCOTIA
HALIFAX
YARMOUTH

"BRUNSWICK MAID"



"TERRY T"
following salvage.

Le "TERRY T" après
le sauvetage.

"ROLAND & SISTERS"

Loss overboard of a visitor whilst disembarking vessel at St. Lawrence, Nfld., November 7, 1987

Summary

The 173 gross ton Canadian fishing vessel "ROLAND & SISTERS" that was forced to seek shelter from an impending storm, secured alongside the Flourspar Ltd. wharf, St. Lawrence, Nfld., at about 0300, November 6, 1987. Two local residents arrived at the wharf at around 2030, November 7. After parking their car, they walked down and around the loading crane located at the corner of the 'L-shaped' wharf. They then boarded the vessel by stepping across to the bulwark rail from the wooden wheelguard of the wharf and down onto the deck. There was no gangway or other safe means of access to board the vessel as required by the Safe Working Practices Regulations made pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act and the Marine Occupational Safety and Health Regulations made pursuant to the Canada Labour Code. The only lighting in the area was that provided by the vessel. Snow mixed with freezing rain and cold temperatures throughout the day made for slippery conditions underfoot.

Once aboard, they met the master and indicated to him that they would like to procure some fish. They were invited to participate in the card game which both declined and were offered alcoholic beverages. Initially, the victim declined but later helped himself to a drink. At about 2330, the master decided to go ashore and advised the two non-invited visitors that one of them could go to the fish-hold and get a couple of fish. The victim, Mr. Power, was advised by his friend that he (Mr. Power) should proceed ashore and meet him at the car. The friend then proceeded to the fish-hold and after procuring some fish, also proceeded to the car. As Mr. Power did not show up, his friend returned to the vessel and within minutes Mr. Power's body was found floating between the ship and the wharf. The victim's friend immediately jumped into the water and while holding one of the mooring lines from the ship he grabbed onto Mr. Power and began mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. Mr. Power showed no sign of life and there was no response; being heavy set, they were unable to haul him out of the water. The master immediately contacted CGRS and requested shore assistance. Within minutes, the RCMP, followed by the local fire brigade members and an ambulance arrived on scene.

Meanwhile, the victim's friend had been in the 2°C water for some 10-15 minutes and complained of numbness; assisted by RCMP, he was hauled out of the water and transported by ambulance to a local hospital where he was treated for hypothermia and shock. Mr. Power's body was also recovered

and transported to the same hospital where a doctor pronounced him dead.

An autopsy revealed that the death was due to drowning in seawater while intoxicated with alcohol. A small cut and bruising over the left eye were apparent.

Findings

On November 7, 1987 while attempting to disembark from the Canadian fishing vessel "ROLAND & SISTERS" onto the St. Lawrence wharf, Mr. R. Power either stumbled or slipped and fell into the icy harbour waters and lost his life. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary and there being no eyewitnesses to his fall, it would appear that the following factors contributed to the accident:

- he was on board the vessel of his own volition;
- he was intoxicated;
- conditions underfoot at the time were slippery; and
- it was dark and the only lighting in the area was that provided by the vessel.

Following his fall, Mr. Power lost his life and it would appear that the following factors contributed to his death:

- immersion in cold water limited his survival time;
- the consumption of alcohol further reduced the already limited survival time;
- valuable survival time was lost as he was not seen falling into the water;
- being heavy set and wearing heavy clothing, he was difficult to retrieve from the water; and
- the noise from the vessel's generator could have rendered any cry for help inaudible.

Other Findings

There was no "access ladder or gangway" to provide safe access to or from the vessel as required by the Safe Working Practices Regulations and the Marine Occupational Safety and Health Regulations.

There was no step ladder from the deck to the rail of the vessel as required by the Safe Working Practices Regulations and the Marine Occupational Safety and Health Regulations.

"ROLAND & SISTERS"

SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 4642	SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 4642 DU SHC
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS	PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES





SKETCH SHOWING WHERE "ROLAND & SISTERS" BERTHED AT NEW EXTENSION TO WHARF AT TIME OF ACCIDENT

CROQUIS MONTRANT LE NOUVEAU PROLONGEMENT DU QUAI OÙ LE "ROLAND & SISTERS" ÉTAIT AMARRÉ AU MOMENT DE L'ACCIDENT

St. Lawrence wharf Quai de St-Lawrence



B.P. "ROLAND & SISTERS" F.V. "ROLAND & SISTERS"

NOTE: The wharf in this photograph is not the wharf where the accident occurred.

NOTA: Le quai sur cette photographie n'est pas celui où l'accident s'est produit.

Vessel's stern secured to this bollard

L'arrière du navire amarré à ce bollard

Wood wheel guards along the perimeter of the wharf

Garde de roue en bois le long du quai

Concrete curbs

Remblais de béton

Concrete walkway 2.7 m wide connecting cribs with steel sheet piling

Passerelle de béton de 2,7 m de largeur relié par un trottoir avec pale planche en acier

This new addition to the wharf 60 m long and 9.6 m wide was constructed of fully ballasted timber cribwork and spans with a steel sheet circular cell at the head.

Ce nouveau prolongement a une longueur de 60 m et une largeur de 9,6 m et a été construit avec une estacade de protection en bois et lesté ainsi qu'un caisson circulaire à la tête revêtu d'une feuille métallique.

"NANCEDA"

Flooding and subsequent sinking off Carmanah Point, Vancouver Island, B.C., March 13, 1987.

Summary

The "NANCEDA" was a small fishing vessel of 108 tons, gross tonnage, built of wood in 1950 and operated as a drum seiner. The vessel was subject to quadrennial inspection by the Ship Safety Branch, Canadian Coast Guard, and was last surveyed in June 1985, including inspection on drydock. The vessel was drydocked by the owner in June 1986, for washing and painting of the hull, and in February, 1987, the existing fibreglass-lined hold space was divided into four compartments by transverse and longitudinal watertight bulkheads and a tilt platform arrangement was installed at the stern.

On March 12, 1987, the "NANCEDA", with a crew of six persons, was engaged in the herring fishery in the Barkley Sound area and at about 2230 she departed the fishing grounds in the company of two or three other vessels, bound for Steveston. She carried approximately a three-quarter load of herring (i.e. 70 tons) and the hold compartments were topped up with water for the operation of the newly installed chilled water (champagne) system. As the "NANCEDA" proceeded southwards at an estimated speed of 9 knots, the sea was relatively calm, with a low south-westerly swell and a light chop, and the weather was reasonably good with a light south-easterly wind and visibility of approximately 12 miles in occasional light rain.

At about 0200, March 13, after having travelled some 28 miles, the bilge alarm for the bilge space below the hold sounded and the engineer started a pump and the space was pumped dry. The mate and the deck-hand on watch were aware at this time of an unusual 'thumping' noise and, despite having checked around the vessel and securing some small loose gear, the noise continued at intervals of 3 to 4 minutes. At about 0250, the bilge alarm again indicated water in the same bilge space and it was observed on this occasion that water was leaking into the engine-room through the shaft gland located in the after bulkhead. The shaft gland was tightened, two bilge pumps were started, and initially the pumps were able to cope with the flooding. After what appeared to be a surge of water entering the engine-room through the bottom hull planking, the water level continued to rise and the master directed the crew to prepare for abandonment.

The mate had earlier been in contact by CB radio with a nearby company vessel and reported the situation, and at 0325 the master sent a 'MAYDAY' call by radiotelephone on VHF

channel 16. The USCG "NEAH BAY", approximately 15 miles from the scene, responded and at 0328 the UTB 41315 was underway and proceeding to assist. RCC, Victoria, was advised of the incident by CCGRS, Tofino, at 0331. A USCG helicopter CG 1464 was airborne and proceeding at 0343, and the CCGC "READY", which was at anchor in the vicinity of Port San Juan approximately 16 miles from the scene, was underway at 0404.

The crew of the "NANCEDA" had, in the meantime, launched the seine skiff and the inflatable liferaft, and donned lifejackets and personal flotation equipment. The fishing vessel "CAPE JAMES" was close by the "NANCEDA" at about 0335 and provided an inflatable boat on a line to take the crew of the "NANCEDA" on board without injury at about 0343. The SAR vessels and the helicopter were stood down before reaching the distressed vessel when it was assured there was no further need of assistance.

The "NANCEDA" sank at about 0357 in position 48°35'48"N, 124°48'26"W, in 50 metres of water and, with an insured value of $650,000, was declared a constructive total loss.

Findings

The fishing vessel "NANCEDA", fully loaded and operating in moderate sea and weather conditions, sank due to an intake of water of unknown origin but it would appear there was failure of the bottom hull planking.

Other Findings

Prompt rescue was achieved as the "NANCEDA" was sailing in the company of other vessels.


APPROXIMATE COURSE OF "NANCEDA"
ROUTE APPROXIMATIVE DU "NANCEDA"
"NANCEDA" SINKING
LE "NANCEDA" QUI COULE
48°35'48"N
124°48'36"W
Chart 3602
BRITISH COLUMBIA
PRINCE RUPERT
PRINCE GEORGE
VANCOUVER
VANCOUVER ISLAND
VICTORIA
"NANCEDA"
SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 3001
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
SECTION DE LA CARTE N° 3001 DU SHC
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES
BANK
SOLAND
Bamfield
Clo-oose
Wukkan Bay
125°00'



"NANCEDA"



Typical hatch opening and subdivision of hold on vessel similar to "NANCEDA".

Ouverture typique d'une écoutille et subdivision de cale d'un navire identique au "NANCEDA".

"PACIFIC SCANNER"

Foundering and beaching in the vicinity of Port San Juan, Vancouver Island, B.C., March 12/13, 1987.

Summary

The "PACIFIC SCANNER" is a small fishing vessel (drum seiner) of 58 tons, gross tonnage, built of wood in 1950, and was operating as a fish packer at the time of the casualty. The vessel is of conventional design and forward of amidships there is an accommodation space and an engine-room with deck-house above. Aft of amidships are the fish hold and a lazaret. The hold is divided into four fibreglass-lined compartments and equipped with a chilled water (champagne) system, and the vessel is fitted with three transverse bulkheads. She is subject to quadrennial inspection by the Ship Safety Branch, Canadian Coast Guard, and was last surveyed in February 1984, including inspection on drydock.

On March 12, 1987, the "PACIFIC SCANNER", with a crew of six, was engaged in the herring fishery in the Barkley Sound area and at 1400 had completed loading approximately 40 tons of roe herring. She departed the fishing grounds at about 1800 in the company of two or three other vessels and was bound for Vancouver. As the "PACIFIC SCANNER" proceeded southwards at an estimated speed of 8.5 knots, the sea was relatively calm, with a low to moderate south-westerly swell, and the weather was good with the wind light to variable, south-easterly to south-westerly, and visibility of approximately 16 miles.

At about 2300, having travelled some 40 miles and when off Carmanah Point, the bilge alarm for the lazaret sounded. Attempts to pump out the lazaret were unsuccessful due to what appeared to be a blocked suction line. There was no sign of water in the engine-room or the forward space but as the vessel progressed southwards, the stern continued to settle very slowly. By 0030, March 13, the vessel had travelled a further 12 miles and was off Owen Point, and the deck at the stern of the vessel was level with the sea. The skipper then radioed a 'MAYDAY' call on VHF channel 78A and declared his intention to seek refuge in Port San Juan and attempt to beach his vessel in the vicinity of Port Renfrew approximately 5 miles distant. The skipper also directed the crew to prepare the life-saving equipment in case abandonment was necessary, and some of the crew put on their immersion suits. While the liferaft was being manhandled from the top of the deck-house to the main deck for launching, the raft slipped and struck and injured one person. It was later determined that the crew member sustained a fractured collar-bone.

The 'MAYDAY' call was acknowledged by the fishing vessel "OCEAN ROYAL" and the request for assistance was relayed to the CCGC "READY" at anchor in Port San Juan. The CCGC "READY" was underway at 0036 and, after the USCG base at Neah Bay, Washington, was advised of the incident, the UTB 41315 was dispatched to assist at 0047. In the meantime the fishing vessel "GREAT NORTHERN 6" arrived close by the "PACIFIC SCANNER" and with the "OCEAN ROYAL" proceeded to escort the distressed vessel towards Port San Juan. The CCGC "READY" was on-scene at 0103 and the "OCEAN ROYAL" and the UTB 41315 were stood down. By this time the access cover to the lazaret of the "PACIFIC SCANNER" was awash and portable pumps were of no use.

The "PACIFIC SCANNER" was safely beached on a soft bottom at about 0200 in the vicinity of Port Renfrew. After the herring and water were pumped from the two after hold compartments, and the water was pumped from the lazaret, there was a freeboard of approximately 0.66 m (26") at the stern and no sign of water leaking into the lazaret. She departed Port Renfrew at about 0600 and, without encountering any further problem, arrived in Vancouver at about 2045, March 13, 1987. The vessel was subsequently drydocked and it was observed that there had been deterioration and/or loss of caulking material in seams and butts at the after end of the deck planking and at the top of the transom timbers where covered and obscured by the stern roller platform. After repairs were completed, the vessel was loaded so as to submerge the deck at the stern and there was no sign of water leaking into the lazaret. Repair costs were in the order of $1000.

Findings

The "PACIFIC SCANNER" foundered due to deterioration of caulking at the stern and a consequential ingress of water to the lazaret. It would appear that the following factors contributed to this casualty:

- the failure to examine the deck planks and transom timbers, where covered and/or partly obscured by the overhanging stern platform, and to effect repairs, and

- the blockage of the bilge suction line from the lazaret, for which the reason was not determined.

Other Findings

Assistance was readily available because the "PACIFIC SCANNER" was sailing in the company of other vessels.

The skipper of the "PACIFIC SCANNER" did not possess a Restricted Radiotelephone Operator's Certificate (Maritime) as required by the General Radio Regulations.

The skipper transmitted a 'Mayday' call by radiotelephone on VHF Channel 78A rather than on the designated distress calling frequency of VHF Channel 16.

Difficulty was encountered in lowering the inflatable liferaft from the top of the deckhouse to the main deck for launching and a crew member suffered a fractured collar bone in the process.


APPROX. COURSE OF "PACIFIC SCANNER"
"PACIFIC SCANNER" BEACHED 1200/13.3.87
LAZARET BILGE ALARM SOUNDED 2300/12.3.87
'MAYDAY' CALL TRANSMITTED 0030/13.3.87
See CAUTION A
For Traffic Exercise A see Chart
ENLARGED SECTION OF CHS CHART No. 3001
SOUNDINGS IN FATHOMS
SONDAGES EN BRASSES
BARKLEY SOUND
Hammond Passage
Cape Beale
Bamfield
Fog Sig FW FlWR 5s 167ft 15M
Fl(2) 7½s 185ft 17M
Pachena Pt Fog Sig
Broken Group
IMPERIAL EAGLE CHAN
Tzartus I
Tzartus Channel
Port Renfrew
Fog Sig
Port San Juan
Owen Pt
Carmanah Pt
Fog Sig Fl 5s 184ft 19M
Clo-oose
Nitinat Lake
Cowichan Lake
Mt Walbran 3670
Carmanah Mtn 3515
Sombrio Pt
Duncan Rk
Tatoosh
Fog Sig
Fl(2)WR 20s 165ft 20M
Flattery
Neah Bay
Mukkaw Bay
Sooes Mtn 1978
JUAN DE FUCA STR
30'
20'
10'



Showing overhanging structure at stern with solid aluminum plate removed to effect repairs.

La plateforme arrière en surplomb avec la plaque solide en aluminium enlevée afin d'effectuer les réparations.



Inside lazaret showing location of seepage between deck plank ends and uppermost transom timbers.

À l'intérieur de la cambuse, montrant les lieux d'infiltration d'eau entre les abouts de bordé du pont et les barreaux supérieurs d'arcasse.

Glossary

CCG	Canadian Coast Guard
CCGC	Canadian Coast Guard Cutter
CCGS	Canadian Coast Guard Ship
CGRS	Coast Guard Radio Station
CMRA	Canadian Marine Rescue Auxiliary
ETA	Estimated time of arrival
Fish Packers	Fishing vessels being used only for transportation of fish
FPV	Fisheries Patrol Vessel
Free surface effect	Whenever there is a surface of liquid which is free to move, there is a loss of effective GM due to a virtual rise of the vessel's centre of gravity and the loss of stability caused by the movement of liquid in partially filled compartments when the vessel rolls. This movement may involve a large shift of weight.
Freeboard	The distance between the waterline and the upper edge of the weather deck.
FV	Fishing Vessel
GM	The distance between the transverse metacentre and the vertical centre of gravity, and is an indication of a vessel's ability to right herself when heeled over.
M	Magnetic
Mayday	Distress signal
MEDEVAC	The urgent evacuation of a person from a vessel for medical reasons
MRSC	Marine Rescue Sub-Centre

Port of refuge	A reasonably safe place of retreat from winds or storms
r.p.m.	Revolutions per minute
RCC	Rescue Co-ordination Centre
SAR	Search and Rescue
SFV	Small fishing vessel
SIC	Steamship Inspection Certificate
SSB	Single sideband radio
T	True
Trim	The difference between the draught forward and aft
VHF	Very high frequency radio